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Envisioning Futures: The Battle Over Democracy
in Hong Kong
I. Introduction
Hong Kong has entered its last years under British administration,
and the dramatic final act is being played out.1 When Hong Kong
reverts to Chinese rule, it will do so under the protection of the Basic
Law,2 a mini-constitution created pursuant to a Joint Declaration 3 be-
tween the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of China (PRC)
that delineates the principles under which Hong Kong will be gov-
erned. The former and future rulers of the city diverge widely in their
political, economic, and social systems, and despite the elaborate detail
of the relevant treaties providing for the transfer,4 there have been
disagreements during the period of transition. Without a doubt, the
most publicly acrimonious debate has concerned the fairly recent pro-
posal by the last British Governor of Hong Kong, Chris Patten, to ex-
pand democratic practices in the Colony.5
This debate over the possibility of expanded democracy in Hong
Kong is important because of the city's unique role in international
trade and commerce. From a "barren rock,"6 Hong Kong has grown
into one of the premier centers of manufacturing, international trade
and finance. 7 Besides the enormous amount of trade that passes
1 Under the agreement between the United Kingdom and the People's Republic of
China, Hong Kong will become a Special Administrative Region of the People's Republic of
China on July 1, 1997. Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People's Republic of China on the
Question of Hong Kong, September 26, 1984, 23 I.L.M. 1366 (1984) [hereinafter Joint
Declaration].
2 The Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People's Re-
public of China, reprinted in NoRMAN MWrERs, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLMCS OF HONG KONG
267 (5th ed. 1991) [hereinafter Basic Law].
3 joint Declaration, supra note 1.
4 Ironically, the Basic Law, authored by the National People's Congress, may contain
the most extensive description and codification of pro-capitalist features ever recited in a
constitution. See Basic Law, supra note 2, arts. 105-135 (requiring, among other things, that
personal property rights be protected; that the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(SAR) must avoid budget deficits; that the government of the Hong Kong SAR must take
steps appropriate to maintain Hong Kong's status as a leading center in finance, shipping,
and aviation; that the Hong Kong dollar will be fully convertible; and that the Hong Kong
SAR will be a free port).
5 See infra part III.
6 See infra note 16 and accompanying text.
7 With a total trade of HK$1,544,868 in 1991, Hong Kong is one of the top 11 traders
in the world. HONG KONG 1992, at 88 (David Roberts ed., 1992). Hong Kong is the second
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through the city, its legal system is highly developed and well suited
for the stability required by international businesspersons, thus making
it a favorite conduit for regional investment. In addition, the United
States in particular is heavily invested in Hong Kong and derives a
huge amount of income from exports to the city.8
From a legal perspective, the issue of democracy in Hong Kong is
important because of the manner of the transfer that is going to take
place: the Hong Kong situation represents a relatively rare form of
nineteenth-century statecraft, where one state has agreed to cede terri-
tory and citizens to another, very different state.9 This kind of diplo-
macy may have been both common and generally accepted at the
previous fin de siicle, but is unusual, and some have suggested illegiti-
mate, as the next century approaches. 10 The importance of this point
becomes evident when one considers that the execution of a smooth
and legitimate transfer is essential if the stability upon which the city's
prosperity rests is to be maintained.
Most importantly, however, the democracy debate uniquely
reveals two opposing visions of Hong Kong's future. One sees a Hong
Kong that will preserve its autonomy, and presumably its prosperity, by
expanding democratic practices and thus foreclosing possible avenues
for Chinese meddling in the functioning of the city. The alternative
vision is one where the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region
(SAR) will continue to function under the benign governance of a re-
moved authority, free from the demands of a democratic society that
some believe reduce economic efficiencies." This potential clash of
ideologies is fascinating because it is likely that the outcome will affect
Hong Kong's post-1997 future in ways that are difficult to predict
largest exporter by value of watches and clothing, and the third largest exporter of toys. Id.
at 81. As a financial center, Hong Kong also racks up impressive numbers: a US$49 billion
per day currency market, and the Hang Seng Index, Hong Kong's principal stock market,
averaged a daily turnover of US$1.3 billion in 1991. Id. at 67, 74.
8 The United States has more than US$7.1 billion invested in Hong Kong and in 1989,
sold US $46 billion in Anerican goods to Hong Kong citizens, making this tiny city America's
fourteenth largest market. Furthermore, many of America's largest corporations have sub-
stantial interests in Hong Kong. WIu.tA McGuaN, PEaRImOus ALBION: THE ABANDONMENT
OF HONG KONG 1997, 116-17 (1992).
9 Article 24(6) of the Basic Law provides that persons who had the right of abode in
Hong Kong only will be deemed permanent residents of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region. Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 24(6). This means that approximately four million
Chinese residents of Hong Kong who are British Dependent Territories Citizens will be
stripped of their British passports and become PRC citizens. NihalJayawickrama, Hong Kong.
The Gathering Storm, 22(2) BuLL. PEACE PROPOSALS 157, 158 (1991).
10 SeeJayawickrama, supra note 9 (discussing the international law ramifications of the
transfer of Hong Kong by the United Kingdom to the PRC, with emphasis on the right of
self-determination).
11 Note that for purposes of this Comment, the names "Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region" or "Hong Kong SAR" refer to Hong Kong under the administration of the Peo-
ple's Republic of China. The term "Hong Kong" denotes the city as it is untilJuly 1, 1997-a




The purpose of this Comment is to examine an issue that is still
very far from decided: whether there will be greater democracy in
Hong Kong, and how the relevant parties have approached this de-
bate. To this purpose, the Comment will begin with a survey of the
most relevant legal background, including an overview of the founda-
tion and rule of the Colony by the British, and the provisions of the
Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. Next, attention will be given to
the often dramatic and always fascinating debate between the United
Kingdom and the People's Republic of China, which ensued after the
last British Governor of Hong Kong proposed greater democracy.
Finally, the ultimate goal of this Comment is to analyze some of
the recurrent themes and patterns in this debate, and from this analy-
sis, attempt to extract an understanding of the British and Chinese
aims and strategies. Even though it is possible to discern some consis-
tency in the fluid discussions between the United Kingdom and the
People's Republic of China, ultimate conclusions are difficult to draw,
especially when there is some likelihood that the issue will not be per-
manently resolved until after the British have withdrawn. Nevertheless,
the debate has progressed far enough that possible outcomes suggest
themselves, and this Comment will conclude with an overview of the
wider ramifications of this struggle.
H. Legal Background
A. Cession by China
Because the area currently known as Hong Kong is composed of
separate areas that were acquired by the British under different terms,
it is necessary to understand the Colony's creation and expansion.
By the middle of the 19th century, Britain and China had devel-
oped an extensive trading relationship, primarily based upon the trade
of British-owned opium for Chinese silver.' 3 The two nations' trading
relations were somewhat unstable, so Lord Palmerston, Britain's For-
eign Secretary, determined a British trading station was needed which
would be free from Chinese intervention. 14 As part of an apparently
temporary settlement of the First Opium War, China ceded Hong
Kong island to the British under the Convention of Chuenpi, January
20, 1841.15 Though neither side was pleased with this arrangement-
Lord Palmerston described Hong Kong as "a barren island with hardly
12 See also HK Needs Democracy to Pmerve Freedom-Repor The Reuters Library Report,
Jan. 22, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File (indicating concerns that without
democratic election of legislative representatives, Hong Kong will be unable to preserve the
level of autonomy necessary for freedom of speech).
Is HONG KONG 1992, supra note 7, at 372-73.
14 Id. at 373.
15 Id.; see map infra p. 207.
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a house upon it"-the British took possession on January 26, 1841.16
One year later, the Treaty of Nanking confirmed the cession of Hong
Kong island to the United Kingdom. 17
Hostilities between the Chinese and Britain resumed in 1856 fol-
lowing disputes about the correct interpretation of previous treaties.' 8
After a brief interlude, fighting once again resumed in 1859, and the
British acquired the Kowloon peninsula by cession in 1860 under the
Convention of Peking, which ended the Second Anglo-Chinese War. 19
In order to enhance the defensibility of the Kowloon peninsula and
Hong Kong harbor, Britain later demanded the surrounding land. A
convention signed onJune 9, 1898, gave the British the desired control
over the New Territories and 235 islands, under a ninety-nine year
lease. 20 Under the convention, the Chinese were to have continued
military access to the wharf at Kowloon City, but Britain revoked this
provision on December 27, 1899, and assumed control of Kowloon
City as well. 21
B. The British Government of Hong Kong
Throughout its history under British rule, Hong Kong has exper-
ienced substantial economic growth based on the entrep6t trade with
China and administered under the "benign neglect" of a laissez-faire
government.22 Hong Kong's governmental structure has remained es-
sentially the same during the years of British rule, although there have
been occasional alterations. There are three branches in the British
government of Hong Kong: the executive branch, composed princi-
pally of the Governor and his advisory Executive Council; the legisla-
tive branch, known as the Legislative Council, or LegCo; and the
judicial branch.23 The most powerful figure in Hong Kong's govern-
ment has always been a London-nominated Governor who has exten-
sive influence over policy. 24 The Governor is advised by the cabinet-
like Executive Council, which helps to develop policy and legislation
through a consensus process.25 The role of LegCo is to enact the legis-
lation presented by the Governor, including the appropriation of fund-
ing.2 6 LegCo may also initiate legislation of its own. 27
16 HONG KONG 1992, supra note 7, at 373.
17 Id. at 374.
18 Id.
19 Id.; see map infra p. 207.
20 Id.; see map infra p. 207.
21 Id.
22 The old joke is that "Hong Kong is run by the Jockey Club, Jardine Matheson, the
Hong Kong Shanghai Bank, and the Governor-in that order." NoRMAN MINERS, THE GOV-
ERNMENT AND PoLrrcs OF HONG KONG 46-47 (5th ed. 1991) (citing R. HUGHES, HONG KONG:
BORROWED PLAcE, BoRRowED TIME 17 (1968)).
23 HONG KONG 1992, supra note 7, at 17.
24 Id.
25 Id. at 18.
26 Id. at 19.
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The method for electing LegCo representatives is the primary sub-
ject of the democracy debate between Britain and the PRC.28 As of
1991, there were sixty members of LegCo who were selected as follows:
three members of the Executive Council are also ex-officio members of
LegCo; eighteen legislators are appointed by the Governor with the
approval of the Secretary of State; and thirty-nine LegCo members are
"elected." 29 Twenty-one of the "elected" members are selected by fif-
teen so-called "functional constituencies," representing various eco-
nomic interests;30 the nine geographical constituencies select two
members each to make up the remaining elected members.31
The two different types of constituency representatives-func-
tional and geographical-are each elected under a different regime.
For functional constituencies, an elector is a corporate individual or
member of one of the professional or occupational sectors who is also
registered for the direct elections.3 2 In elections for representation
within a geographical constituency, one may vote if one has registered
for the District Board direct elections where one lives.33 The effect of
the constituency system has been to limit severely the number of eligi-
ble voters. The electors for the functional constituencies have been
particlarly limited.
C. The Joint Declaration
Under this relatively undemocratic system, Hong Kong has exper-
ienced remarkable growth and prosperity throughout its history as a
Colony of Britain. Hong Kong's status became unclear, however, in
1984 when Britain and the PRC entered negotiations concerning its
future. These talks were precipitated by the pending expiration of the
ninety-nine year lease on the New Territories. 34 From the beginning,
the Chinese were adamant that the lease on the New Territories would
not be renewed. Even though Britain owns Hong Kong island and
27 Id.
28 There have been some additional concerns over the fact that the Governor of the
Hong Kong SAR will be appointed by the PRC, but this arrangement has not been seriously
challenged yet.
29 HONG KONG 1992, supra note 7, at 19.
30 There are two types of functional constituencies, a group of six that each elect two
representatives and the balance of nine who select one each. The following are the func-
tional constituencies which may select two LegCo members each: commercial; industrial;
finance and financial services; labor; medical and health care; engineering, architectural,
surveying and planning. The other nine functional constituencies, each of which elect one
representative, are social services; teaching; legal; accountancy; real estate and construction;
tourism; Urban Council; Regional Council; and rural. Id. at 19.
31 Each of the nine geographical constituencies elects two LegCo members. The nine
geographical constituencies are Hong Kong Island East, Hong Kong Island West, Kowloon
East, Kowloon Central, Kowloon West, New Territories (NT) North, NT South, NT West and
NT East. Id.
32 Id. at 27.
33 Id. at 26-27.
34 See supra note 20 and accompanying text; see map, infra p. 207.
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Kowloon in perpetuity under the 19th century treaties of cession, the
British believed these areas could never be severed from the mainland
territories and they felt compelled to negotiate the cession of the en-
tire colony back to the PRC.3 5
The Joint Declaration, a fairly extensive statement outlining the
principles by which Hong Kong's future will be decided, was the fruit
of those negotiations and was issued by the People's Republic of China
and the United Kingdom on December 19, 1984.56 As the predecessor
to the Basic Law, the Joint Declaration and its Annexes provided the
skeleton upon which the Basic Law was built and are essential tools for
interpreting the Basic Law. To understand the Joint Declaration, it is
helpful to divide it into three different sections: two sets of unilateral
statements by the respective parties and a series of joint statements.3 7
The second paragraph of the Joint Declaration is the unilateral
statement issued by Britain providing that all of Hong Kong will return
to the People's Republic of China on July 1, 1997.38 The first and third
paragraphs contain unilateral statements made by the PRC. In these,
the PRC emphasizes that "to recover the Hong Kong area ... is the
common aspiration of the entire Chinese people."39 Next, the third
paragraph recites an extensive list of the PRC's policies towards Hong
Kong, the most significant being that the PRC would have responsibil-
ity for the promulgation of Hong Kong's Basic Law.40 In addition,
35 Whether or not there is an agreement between Her Majesty's Government
and the Chinese Government, the New Territories will revert to China on July
1, 1997, under the terms of the 1898 Convention. The remainder of Hong
Kong (Hong Kong Island, Kowloon, and Stonecutters Island) would not be
viable alone. Hong Kong, including the New Territories, has since 1898 be-
come an integral whole and Her Majesty's Government is satisfied that there is
no possibility of dividing the New Territories which revert to China on July 1,
1997, from the remainder. The choice is therefore between reversion of Hong
Kong to China under agreed, legally binding international arrangements or
reversion to China without such arrangements.
Jayawickrama, supra note 9, at 159 (quoting the Joint Declaration, para. 29).
36 Joint Declaration, supra note 1.
37 Liu Yiu Chu, Interpretation and Review of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Adminis-
trative Region, 2 J. CHnsE L. 49 (1988).
38 "The Government of the United Kingdom declares that it will restore Hong Kong to
the People's Republic of China with effect from I July 1997." Joint Declaration, supra note 1,
para. 2.
39 Id. para. 1. Note that for purposes of the Joint Declaration, the term "Hong Kong"
includes Hong Kong island, Kowloon, and the New Territories; see supra notes 15-21 and
accompanying text (describing the legal differences between the cession of Hong Kong and
Kowloon, and the ninety-nine year lease of the New Territories).
40 In twelve subparts, the third paragraph of the Joint Declaration states China's basic
policies towards Hong Kong: (1) "uphold[ing] national unity and territorial integrity"; (2)
Hong Kong will be a Special Administrative Region under the authority of the People's
Republic of China; (3) "[t]he laws currently in force in Hong Kong will remain basically
unchanged," and the Special Administrative Region will be self-governing; (4)"[t]he Govern-
ment of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region will be composed of local inhabitants.
The chief executive will be appointed by the Central People's Government on the basis of
the results of elections or consultations to be held locally"; (5) the social and economic sys-
tems, the life-style, and the basic rights and freedoms currently enjoyed in Hong Kong will
remain unchanged; (6) Hong Kong will continue to be a free port; (7) Hong Kong will
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subpart three of paragraph three of the Basic Law states that the "cur-
rent" laws in Hong Kong will remain "basically unchanged" and that
the Hong Kong SAR will be "self-governing." 41
The true "joint declarations" are contained in paragraphs four
through eight. 42 The fourth paragraph provides that Britain will con-
tinue to administer Hong Kong during the transitional period, "with
the object of maintaining and preserving its economic prosperity and
social stability," and that the government of the People's Republic of
China will "cooperate" in this endeavor.43 Paragraph five establishes
the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group (JLG), which is to function under
the auspices of Annex II to the Joint Declaration. 44 The sixth para-
graph states that land leases in Hong Kong are dealt with in Annex
III, 45 while paragraph seven provides that both parties are to imple-
ment the Annexes to the Joint Declaration. 46 The eighth and final
paragraph provides that the Joint Declaration and its Annexes shall
become binding with the exchange of instruments of ratification to
have taken place in Beijing before June 30, 1985. 47
The three Annexes to the Joint Declaration substantially elaborate
on that instrument's eight paragraphs. Annex I defines the nature of
the relationship that will exist between the Hong Kong SAR and the
People's Republic of China. One of its most significant provisions, for
purposes of this Comment, is that "the legislature of the Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region shall be constituted by election."48 The
other important stipulation is that, after the establishment of the Hong
Kong SAR, the current laws in Hong Kong will remain in force unless
they contravene the Basic Law, subject to amendment by the Hong
Kong SAR legislature. 49 Annex II to the Joint Declaration states the
duties and powers of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group, 50 while An-
continue as a center of finance, gold and securities trading, and its dollar will remain freely
convertible; (8) Hong Kong will have independent finances and will not be taxed by the
People's Republic of China; (9) the Hong Kong SAR may establish economic relations with
other countries; (10) the Hong Kong SAR will use the name "Hong Kong, China; (11) the
government of the Hong Kong SAR will have responsibility for maintaining public order;
(12) these principles will be elaborated and stipulated in a Basic Law, to be drafted and
promulgated by the National People's Congress, and will remain unchanged for 50 years."
Id. para. 3.
41 Id.
42 Id. paras. 4-8.
43 Id. para. 4.
44 Id. para. 5; see infra note 50 and accompanying text (describing Annex II).
45 joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 6. Note that no land in Hong Kong is privately
owned, with the exception of one plot; instead, it is held through long-term leases with the
government. Consequently, one major concern has been the security of those leases after
the Chinese take over the city on July 1, 1997.
46 Id. para. 7.
47 Id. para. 8.
48 Id. Annex I (I).
49 Id. Annex I (II).
50 The JLG is charged with smoothing the period of transition by conducting negotia-
tions and exchanging information. Id. Annex 11 (3). Special matters for consideration by
1993]
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nex III addresses issues involving land leases. 51
D. The Basic Law
The Basic Law is the mini-constitution, promulgated and adopted
by the National People's Congress on April 4, 1990, under which the
Hong Kong SAR is to be governed.5 2 Modeled on the Joint Declara-
tion,53 the Basic Law incorporates many of the principles of that docu-
ment and seeks to give effect to its intent. In structure, the Basic Law
consists of 160 Articles, followed by three Annexes. Because of the
breadth of the Basic Law, this Comment can survey only those Articles
which are most relevant to the issue of democracy in Hong Kong.5 4
Article 2 states that the "National People's Congress authorizes
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region to exercise a high degree
of autonomy."55 The significance of this Article is that it employs highly
ambiguous terminology that could be subjected to differing interpreta-
tions. Even more ambiguous is Article 68, which describes how mem-
bers of the Legislative Counsel are to be elected. 56 It states that
the Legislative Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion shall be constituted by election. The method for forming the
Legislative Council shall be specified in light of the actual situation in
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and in accordance with
the principle of gradual and orderly progress. The ultimate aim is the
election of all members of the Legislative Council by universal
suffrage.
57
Article 68 contains some ambiguous terminology. For example,
though it alludes to universal suffrage as an ultimate aim, there is no
firm time frame for its implementation. Instead, Article 68 says that
suffrage will be increased "in light of the actual situation" in the Hong
the JLG include the maintenance of Hong Kong's economic status and its membership in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Id. Annex 11 (4) (a), (b). Annex II specif-
ically provides that theJLG is not, in any manner, an organ of governance. Id. Annex 11 (6).
The JLG is to meet at least three times each year, and each delegation shall include a senior
representative of Ambassadorial rank, four other members, and up to twenty supporting
staff. Id. Annex 11 (9), (7); see infra note 123 and accompanying text.
51 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, Annex III; see supra note 45.
52 Basic Law, supra note 2.
53 But see Robin Fitzsimons, Whose Law Will Rule Hong Kong?, THE TIMES, June 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (quoting commentators who indicate that the
Basic Law is not faithful to the Joint Declaration and that it must be amended to afford Hong
Kong the full measure of promised autonomy).
54 For more on the Basic Law and its effects in Hong Kong, see BAsc LAw, BASIC QuEs-
TTONs: THE DEBATE CONTINUES (William McGurn ed., 1988) [hereinafter BASic QUESTIONS];
HONG KONG: THE CHALLENGE OF TRSFORMATION (Kathleen Cheek-Milby and Miron
Mushkat eds., 1989); HONG KONG's BAsic Law: PROBLEMS & PROSPECrs (Peter Wesley-Smith
ed., 1990); Liu Yiu Chu, Interpretation and Review of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region, 2J. CHINESE L. 49 (1988); Patricia Homan Palumbo, Analysis of the Sino-
British Joint Declaration and the Basic Law of Hong Kong: What Do They Guarantee the People of
Hong Kong After 1997?, 6 CONN. J. Irr'L L. 667 (1991).
55 Basic Law, supra note 2, art. 2 (emphasis added).
56 Id. art. 68.
57 Id.
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Kong SAR, and according to a goal of "orderly progress."58 One might
suggest that these terms allow so much leeway as to be meaningless,
beyond any palliative value they might have.
The other provisions of the Basic Law that are most relevant to
this Comment outline the nature of the Hong Kong SAR's autonomy
in its relations with the People's Republic of China. As a starting point,
Article 8 stipulates that all laws previously in force in Hong Kong shall
remain so in the Hong Kong SAR unless they contradict the Basic
Law.59 Furthermore, Article 17 endows the Standing Committee of
the National People's Congress with the authority to invalidate any law
passed by the legislature of the Hong Kong SAR that is determined to
contradict the Basic Law.6° Thus, one concern is the extent to which
the Basic Law guarantees of legal continuity in Article 8 are undercut
by the Standing Committee's powers to invalidate laws it determines
are in contradiction with the Basic Law. Given the ambiguity of the
Basic Law's terms with respect to the election of LegCo representa-
tives-particularly with regard to the time frame for universal suf-
frage-it is possible that the Standing Committee could legally
implement or rescind democratic procedures almost at will.
Ill. The Democracy Debate
Having surveyed the relevant legal background to the current situ-
ation in Hong Kong, the next step is to examine the actual controversy
which has ensued between the PRC and Britain over the prospect of
increased democracy. Perhaps the most relevant period to examine, if
one wishes to understand the proposed changes in Hong Kong's gov-
ernment, begins when Chris Patten took over as the last British Gover-
nor of Hong Kong.61
In his first policy address as Governor, given on October 7, 1992,
Chris Patten indicated his specific desire to increase democracy in
Hong Kong.62 The specific goal of the proposals-to increase direct
representation-would be effected by raising the number of directly
58 Id.
59 Id. art. 8.
60 If the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, after consulting
the Committee for the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Re-
gion, considers that any law enacted by the legislature of the Region is not in
conformity with the provisions of this Law regarding affairs within the responsi-
bility of the Central Authority or regarding the relationship between the Cen-
tral Authorities and the Region, the Standing Committee may return the law in
question but shall not amend it. Any law returned by the Standing Committee
of the National People's Congress shall immediately be invalidated. This invali-
dation shall not have retroactive effect, unless otherwise provided for in the
laws of the Region.
Id. art. 17.
61 Chris Patten took over as Governor on July 9, 1992. Philip Bowring, Hong Kong Elite
Shifts Loyalty to Future Patrons in Beijing, THE GuARIAxN, July 7, 1992, at 9.
62 Beijing Rejects Proposed Democratic Reform for Hong Kong, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Oct. 8,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File [hereinafter Beijing Rejects Reform].
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elected LegCo representatives 63 and expanding the number of eligible
voters from 110,000 to 2.7 million by lowering the voting age from 21
to 18; by implementing new procedures for the indirectly elected
LegCo members; and by electing members of municipal boards and
district boards rather than appointing them. 64 Most significantly, by
creating nine new functional constituencies, the proposals would en-
franchise all of Hong Kong's workers.65 At the same time Chris Patten
announced these proposals, the British Prime MinisterJohn Major met
with Hong Kong's outspoken critic of the PRC and proponent of de-
mocracy, Martin Lee.6 6 Because Mr. Lee's views have made him highly
unpopular with the Chinese, this meeting was probably held to indi-
cate to the Chinese that Britain would not back down on its proposals
merely to avoid offending the Chinese.
The PRC responded in a manner and form that would become
somewhat typical as the rhetorical debate and political posturing on
this issue continued: Chinese foreign affairs spokesman Wu Jianmin
issued a prepared statement broadly condemning Patten's proposals as
violating the provisions of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. 67
The response may be termed "typical" because it has a number of fea-
tures that have recurred during the ongoing debate. For example, the
Chinese statement followed a British initiative-here Patten's propos-
als during his first policy address-and condemned the British sugges-
tions as violative of the spirit of the agreements between the two
nations. In addition, Mr. Wu's statement alluded to a legal underpin-
ning suggesting that the proposed changes might be invalid because
they were inconsistent with the Basic Law.68 Naturally, this position
raises a number of subissues. The primary ones are whose interpreta-
tion of the Basic Law applies, and which provision should take prece-
dence if there is a conflict. Both of these important questions must be
reserved, however, for later consideration. 69
Mr. Wu's press briefing contained one further aspect that has
63 Bowring, supra note 61, at 9-10.
64 Legislature Apprmes Patten's Plan, FACrS ON FLE WORLD NEws DIG., Nov. 19, 1992, at
885.
65 Hong Kong: 'Hsin Pao' Interview With Governor Patten, THE BBC SUMMARY OF WORID
BROADCASTS, June 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. This propo-
sal was a drastic change from the existing system in Hong Kong, where a relatively narrow
group of elite businesspersons and professionals had the sole right to vote in the functional
constituency elections. Essentially, the Patten proposals would extend a right which had pre-
viously only been held by the company owner down to the contrucion workers. For more on
the role of the functional constituencies, see supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
66 Bowring, supra note 61.
67 Beijing Rejects Reform, supra note 62.
68 Wu restated the Chinese position that the Basic Law constrains Britain not to alter
the government of Hong Kong prior to 1997, indicating that "'[tihe Chinese side always
maintains that there should not be major changes in the current political system in Hong
Kong and that the evolution of the political system should converge with the Basic Law....'"
Id.
69 See infra part IV.
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since appeared repeatedly in the PRC's response to British initiatives.
It is the implicit threat that any changes regarded as illegal by China
under the Basic Law will be reversed when the PRC takes over.70 Es-
sentially, this response reminds the British authorities, in case they
might have forgotten, that in the end China will be able to resolve any
disputes to its own satisfaction.
Despite this implicit warning, the press statement also was worded
to indicate that the Chinese position was not completely inflexible.
For example, Mr. Wu stated that the Chinese would oppose any "major
changes," 71 thus implying at least some willingness to accept minor
changes to the existing governing system. It should also be noted that
China declined to clarify, at this point, the actual measures that would
be taken should a disfavored change be made. 72
Following the Chinese broadside directed against the proposed
democratic changes, Mr. Patten responded to the allegations that the
proposals violated the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law.73 In a
speech before Hong Kong businesspersons, Mr. Patten stated "[i]f peo-
ple say that what I've set out isn't in conformity with the Joint Declara-
tion and the Basic Law, I think it is incumbent upon them to indicate
why. . . ."74 More than a rhetorical flourish, this response sought to
avoid some of the vitriol that began to pour forth from various Chinese
sources by focusing the debate on the Basic Law's provisions regarding
changes made to Hong Kong's government. 75 As such, it indicates the
ostensible British position that the disagreement should be settled in a
legalistic manner by referring to the provisions of the source docu-
ments. This response would also come to be characteristic of Britain's
handling of the democracy debate.
Mr. Patten next undertook to argue the British position by visiting
the PRC and meeting with various officials. The meeting does not ap-
pear to have been particularly productive for either side, however.
While in China, Mr. Patten was denied a meeting with the Chinese
Prime Minister Li Peng.76 It had been customary for the governor of
Hong Kong to meet with a high level official, and this apparent diplo-
70 Mr. Wu stated that if " 'the evolution of the political system in Hong Kong during the
transitional period would not consist with the Basic Law, the Chinese side shall not be held
responsible . . .'" Beijing Reects Reform, supra note 62. "'By then, the Hong Kong special
administrative region of the People's Republic of China and concerned organisations will be
set up in accordance with the Basic Law and related regulations passed by the National Peo-
ple's Congress... .' China Repeats Opposition to Patten Hong Kong Plan, The Reuters Library
Report, Oct. 9, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
71 See supra note 68.
72 China Repeats Opposition to Patten Hong Kong Plan, supra note 70.
73 Patten Challenges China to Say How He Violates Pact, INT'L HrjtaRA Tpam., Oct. 10, 1992.
74 Id.
75 Despite increasingly hostile attacks by the Chinese, Mr. Patten never publicly strayed
from his focus on the validity of the actual proposals.
76 Carrie Gracie, Patten Impatient as Beijing Snubs his Political Reforms for Hong Kong, THE
GuARDLAN, Oct. 22, 1992.
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matic snub was probably intended to indicate official Chinese displea-
sure with Mr. Patten's proposals. 77 If the goal was to dissuade the
governor from pursuing the issue, however, it did not have that effect.
In fact, Mr. Patten heightened his rhetoric by indicating his intention
that the proposals would be presented, on schedule, for LegCo
consideration. 78
This suggestion was not received favorably by the Chinese.
Rather, it was quickly assaulted by a variety of official, quasi-official and
supposedly private rhetorical attacks on the proposals and, with in-
creasing frequency, on Mr. Patten himself. An official Chinese news
magazine vilified the proposals, saying "It]his goes against the will of
the people... [,]damages Hong Kong's social stability, constitutes an
obstacle to the smooth transition and represents a fundamental viola-
tion of the Sino-British Joint Declaration." 79 At the same time, Lu
Ping, Director of China's Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office held a
news conference where he intimated that if democracy were pressed in
Hong Kong, China might withdraw its support for the new airport
under construction in Hong Kong.80 As China's guarantees are neces-
sary to secure much of the funding for the HK$ 163.5 billion 8l airport
project, Lu Ping's remarks brought a new level of immediacy to the
debate.8 2 Predictably, Chris Patten responded by issuing a statement
that the airport project would go forth with or without China's sup-
port, to which Lu Ping countered by threatening that if that were the
case, planes using the airport would be barred from flying in Chinese
airspace.83
The media onslaught followed less official channels as well. One
77 Avid R. Schweisberg, Hong Kong Governor Hangs Tough on Democracy Plan, UPI, Oct.
22, 1992, available in, LEXIS Nexis Library, Current File.
78 Id.
79 Patten to Argue for Hong Kong Democracy with China, The Reuters Library Report, Oct.
19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File; see also Hong Kong Governor's Proposals
Could Cause "Chaos," THE BBC SUMMARY OF WORLD BROADCASTS, Oct. 12, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File (quoting former member of LegCo Maria Tam Wai-
chu as saying the proposed changes violate the Basic Law).
80 Andrew Boone, China Warns Hong Kong's Patten Over Democracy, Reuters Library Re-
port, Oct. 23, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
81 Simon Holberton, Patten Raises Stakes over Hong Kong's Future: An Unprecedented Contest
is Looming, FIN. Tices, Oct. 26, 1992, at 4.
82 Much of the funding for the new airport is through long-term debt instruments. As
most of this debt will extend beyond the turnover in 1997, it has been necessary to get the
Chinese government to guarantee it. A removal of Chinese guarantees and, even worse, the
possibility that China might dishonor the debt, could devastate the project. Andrew Boone,
China Warns Britain Against Hong Kong Democracy, The Reuters Library Report, Oct. 23, 1992,
available in, LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
83 Boone, supra note 80, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. Note that from
the time the new airport was proposed, there has been a fair amount of dispute concerning
the project. The Chinese have alleged that the multi-billion dollar project was conceived as a
vehicle through which the British government could drain Hong Kong's substantial foreign
currency reserves and throw lucrative contracts to British construction companies. At the
time Lu Ping gave this statement, the Hong Kong government had already let contracts
worth HK$19 billion. Holbertson, supra note 81.
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report indicates that in the week following Chris Patten's first post-
proposal meeting with Chinese officials, more than seventy "attacks"
on him and his plans were printed in the pro-Beijing press in Hong
Kong. 84 These attacks took a variety of forms, one of the most extreme
being an allegation that Chris Patten actually desired to prevent the
turnover in 1997, or make Hong Kong into an independent state.85 At
the same time, the semi-official Chinese sources reiterated the threat
to reverse any democratic changes, while characterizing Chris Patten's
proposals as "improper" and "illegal."86 Much to the chagrin of Chi-
nese authorities, on November 11, 1992, the Hong Kong Legislative
Council approved in a vote of 32-21 a motion supporting Patten's pro-
posals. 87 Once again, the Chinese responded with renewed allegations
that this evidenced British intentions to ignore the Joint Declaration
and Basic Law,88 and the PRC issued its most blistering attack yet on
Chris Patten.89 Furthermore, the PRC indicated its opinion that
LegCo could not even be involved at this point.90 This reaction
pointed up the fundamental difference between the British and Chi-
nese views on the legality of democratic changes in Hong Kong: the
British believe that the terms of Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
84 Holbertson, supra note 81.
85 Zhou Nan, the director of the Hong Kong branch of China's Xinhua News Agency,
stated that "[a]nyone who dreams of turning Hong Kong into an independent or semi-in-
dependent state or to retain the colonial rule in disguise will never get his way." Although
this statement did not name Chris Patten specifically, it seems likely that it was implicitly
intended as a warning to him. China Accuses Patten of Seeking Independent Hong Kong, PREss
ASS'N NEWSnLE, Nov. 7, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File. Another report
of the same press conference quotes Zhou Nan as further stating that:
The Hong Kong British authorities are confronted with two choices. One is to
leave the Basic Law aside and continue to go their own way, which will inevita-
bly infringe upon the interests of the Hong Kong residents and undermine the
territory's stability and prosperity. The Chinese government will not bear any
responsibility for all the consequences arising therefrom. The other choice is
to return to the course of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law and abide by
the understanding reached by the Chinese and British governments.
China Vows it Will Dismantle any Hong Kong Reforms, The Reuters Library Report, Nov. 7, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
86 One Beijing-controlled radio station aired a statement that "[i]f [Patten] continues to
break his promises and stubbornly press his own ideas and make improper arrangements
contravening the Basic Law and sabotage the peaceful transition of power, then in 1997...
the Chinese side will establish its own legislature,judicial and administrative organs." Gareth
Hewett, Democracy Dispute To Spur Volatility, SOUTH CHINA MORNING PosT, Nov. 9, 1992, avail-
able in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.87 Jeremy Wagstaff, Hong Kong Calls for More Democracy from China, UK The Reuters Li-
brary Report, Nov. 12, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File; Denise Young,
China Blasts H.K Legislators for Pro-Reform Vote, The Reuters Library Report, Nov. 12, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
88 Young, supra note 87.
89 Zhang Jusheng, Vice Director of the Hong Kong branch of China's Xinhua news
agency stated that "[Patten] has always been irrational." Jeremy Wagstaff, China Calls Patten
Irrational Over HK Reforms, The Reuters Library Report, Nov. 13, 1992, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Reuter File.
90 "The Hong Kong issue is a matter between China and the United Kingdom before
July 1, 1997.... It is inappropriate for any third party to make irresponsible remarks on the
Hong Kong issue." Young, supra note 87.
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allow alterations to be made until the Chinese takeover; the Chinese
interpret the agreements as requiring that, from the moment they
come into force, no more alterations could be made by Britain to the
system of governance in Hong Kong.91 As such, the Chinese under-
standing would seem to be that LegCo can currently have no role in
the discussions between the two nations on the proposed changes to
Hong Kong's electoral system because no changes are permitted until
China has agreed to allow them.
At this point, a brief period of reconciliation between Britain and
the People's Republic of China occurred. On November 17, 1992,
British Prime Minister John Major met with the Chinese Vice-Premier
Zhu Rongji in London and conducted discussions, which were charac-
terized as "very amiable."92 In the meeting, both sides apparently
reemphasized their respective desires that the transition phase go forth
in accordance with the Basic Law.93 Such statements do not necessar-
ily indicate that the parties had reached any substantive agreement,
however, since it seems that each side felt as though the Basic Law
supported their position only. The depth of the rapprochement
should also be doubted because the Chinese Vice-Premier asked
whether the "LJoint Declaration] should go with the wind," apparently
suggesting that Britain's position might cause the PRC to withdraw en-
tirely from the legal arrangements governing Hong Kong's future.94
Any hopes raised by the cordial London meeting were quickly
dashed when a high ranking Chinese official attacked Patten's propos-
als. Speaking in Beijing, Chinese Premier Li Peng said on November
23, 1992, that "[democracy in Hong Kong] is a matter of principle ....
The Chinese government will -never compromise or make any conces-
sion on matters of principle .... Any counter-proposal or any compro-
mise plan on the basis of the Hong Kong governor's plan is
unacceptable." 95 Besides emphasizing a very hard-line position, Li
Peng's statement gave an answer to Chris Patten's repeated requests
that if China opposed his package it should suggest a compromise. 96 It
left no doubt that, at least publicly, the Chinese government was un-
willing to use Chris Patten's proposals as a base from which a dialogue
on possible democratic alterations might be started.97
91 See infra notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
92 Alexander Nicoll & Ivor Owen, Britain Tells China It Supports Greater HK Democracy,
FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 1992, at 20.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Li Peng Condemns Hong Kong Democracy Plans, AGENcE FRANCE PRSE, Nov. 23, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File.
96 Andrew Browne, China Accuses Patten of Gambling with Hong Kong, The Reuters Library
Report, Nov. 24, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
97 The Chinese intransigence on this point may be a result of a belief that the Joint
Declaration froze into place the existing form of government in Hong Kong, and therefore,
there can be no alterations. See also infra notes 168-171 and accompanying text.
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Shortly thereafter, Chinese officials took a different tack in their
effort to increase pressure on the British authorities. In a statement
released on November 30, 1992, China's Hong Kong and Macau Af-
fairs Office warned that "[c] ontracts, leases and agreements signed and
ratified by the Hong Kong British government which are not approved
by the Chinese side will be invalid after June 30, 1997."98 The nature
of the statement makes it difficult to be certain what prompted it. To
the extent that it explicitly threatens long-term contracts, the state-
ment may have been directed towards the airport project, but given
the context of the furious debate over the introduction of greater de-
mocracy in Hong Kong-and the fact that such a statement could be
calculated to pressure the British by upsetting conditions in the city-it
also seems very possible that it was just the latest step in China's contin-
ued opposition to the democracy proposals.99 The British authorities
downplayed the statement, emphasizing that contracts legally made
prior to the changeover in 1997 would continue to be enforceable
under the Basic Law.10 0 Nevertheless, the rumor-driven Hong Kong
stock market experienced a minor crash the following business day'01
which was probably largely attributable to the Chinese statement. Not
willing to miss any opportunity, Chinese officials took issue over the
cause of the crash, blaming Chris Patten's democratic proposals for
destabilizing the market.'0 2
The struggle had reached such a peak by this point that the Prime
Minister's Policy Advisor, Sir Percy Craddock, characterized it "as the
most serious crisis we have had over Hong Kong over the last 10
years.... To find anything like the same state of tension, I think I'd
have to go back to the cultural revolution in the 1960s."103 If the per-
formance of the stock market is a criterion by which to measure the
98 China Threatens Hong Kong Veto, PRESS Ass'N NEwsnLE, Nov. 30, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
99 One report quotes British "diplomatic sources" as suggesting that the intent of the
statement was to increase pressure on Chris Patten. Sue Baker, Britain Rejects Beijing Claim of
Hong Kong Veto Power, Reuters Library Report, Nov. 30, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Li-
brary, Reuter File. Another commentator emphasized the effect the statement would have
on the public, saying "[iut keeps the pressure on business to support the Chinese side....
Politically it's pretty savvy, but from an overall confidence point of view it's not too good."
Andrew Roche, HK Shares Crash, Patten Accuses China, Dec. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Reuter File.
100 Baker, supra note 99.
101 The Hang Seng index dropped 400.60 points, losing more than 7% of its value.
Roche, supra note 99. The drop was the largest since the Tiananmen Square massacre in
1989, when the market dropped 581 points. Id. In all, share prices dropped 23% since the
beginning of the row with China. Id. Several days after the crash, Standard & Poor's Corp.
lowered its credit ratings of the Hong Kong government, stating that this reflected the deteri-
oration of relations between Britain and China. Hong Kong Placed on Credit Watch, UPI, Dec.
7, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
102 China Questions Basic Pact on Hong Kong Handover, The Reuters Library Report, Dec. 3,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
103 Most Serious Sino-British Crisis in 10 Years, Advisor Warns, AGENCE FRaca PRESSE, Dec.
3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File.
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crisis, then certainly this was a dark hour for Hong Kong. Between
November 30 and December 3, the Hang Seng Index lost 1,008 points,
or 16.8 percent. 10 4 At the same time, British Foreign Secretary Dennis
Hurd stated "[i]t is a good thing if China and Britain, during the period
up to 1997, can work together and would like to do so on this occa-
sion.... But that is not the same as saying the Chinese have the right
to tell us... what we can or cannot do in areas that are our responsibil-
ity."' ° 5 This was the first time in the debate that the British implied
that they were both empowered and willing to go forth with the
changes, with or without the PRC's approval. Until this point, by seek-
ing China's cooperation Britain had given the impression that it re-
garded China's consent as crucial to implementing Chris Patten's
proposals.
December 8, 1992 saw the beginning of yet another three-day
meeting of the Sino-British Joint Liaison Group. The meeting began
inauspiciously with the Chinese representative stating that China
would neither discuss the current democratic proposals nor make
counter proposals." °6 Apparently, the negotiators were unable to
break the deadlock, and the Chinese refused to enter the customary
joint statement at the conclusion of the meeting."° 7 In an independ-
ent statement, the Chinese reiterated their position that the British
proposals were illegal under the Basic Law and consequently, that the
Basic Law itself might no longer be valid."18 Lu Ping stated that "[t] he
problem . .. is not the faster pace or slower pace of democratiza-
tion.... The principle is whether one should keep one's promises." 1 9
Nevertheless, some British commentators were heartened by the fact
that the talks took place at all and that neither party walked out. 110
The British received some additional encouragement when,
shortly after the new year began, China's Premier Li Peng reaffirmed
that the PRC was committed to the principles embodied in the Joint
Declaration."' The Premier's statement was significant in that it
backed away from the previous threat that the Chinese regarded the
104 Gene Linn, Stock Market is Casualty in War of Words, UPI, Dec. 20, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
105 China Has No Right to Dictate Hong Kong Policy, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 4, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File.
106 David Stamp, "No Tango, "Says China in Hong Kong Talks, The Reuters Library Report,
Dec. 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
107 Andrew Roche, Focus-Britain and China Remain Deadlocked Over HK The Reuters Li-
brary Report, Dec. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
108 A Chinese representative questioned: "If the agreements arrived at by the Chinese
and the British sides can be scrapped, then what's the point for us to continue to discuss and
reach agreements within the JLG?" Id.
109 China Accuses Britain of Diplomatic 'Scam' Over Hong Kong, AGENCE FRANCE PRaE, Dec.
22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File.
110 Roche, supra note 107.
111 Speaking through the Xinhua News Agency, Li Peng stated that "[t]he Chinese gov-
ernment, which keeps its promises and good faith, will, as always, act in accordance with the
principles and stipulations of the Sino-British Joint Declaration, the Hong Kong Basic Law
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Basic Law as invalidated by the British proposals. 112 Meanwhile, a note
of dissent from Chris Patten's inner circle of advisors was detected
when Felice Lieh Mak suggested in an interview that the drive for de-
mocracy might rebound against Hong Kong's interests. 113 Her con-
cern was that the row with China would hurt Hong Kong's economy,
stating that "Hong Kong's economic strength and viability is our one
trump card to maintain our autonomy and to really maintain the prin-
ciple of Hong Kong people governing Hong Kong."114 This particular
criticism had been leveled before, most frequently by members of
Hong Kong's business community and pro-Chinese groups. Despite
this internal criticism, the somewhat changed tone of the Chinese rhet-
oric seemed encouraging, and plans went forward to present the pro-
posals to the legislature within one month."15
On February 9, 1993, Hong Kong's cabinet, the Executive Coun-
cil, approved a bill based on Patten's reforms." 6 Shortly thereafter,
amid rumors that talks with China would resume, the Hang Seng index
soared to a record high." 7 But when Chris Patten suggested that the
proposals would be presented to LegCo on schedule, Lu Ping re-
sponded by stating that China would immediately begin preparations
to establish a shadow government for Hong Kong if Chris Patten car-
ried out his proposed democratic changes."l 8 Lu Ping stated that
"[s]tarting from now we have to make preparations in all areas. We
only have a little more than four years time, so we have to work hard to
make preparations."' 19 Predictably, Mr. Lu did not neglect to include
the now customary attack on Chris Patten, in response to his publica-
tion of the democratic proposals, branding the Governor "highly irre-
and other relevant agreements." China Will Stick to Joint Declaration, The Reuters Library Re-
port, Jan. 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
112 See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
113 David Stamp, Top Patten Adviser Queries HKDiveforDemocracy, The Reuters Library
Report, Jan. 11, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File. Public dissent emanat-
ing from the Executive Council is relatively rare, as decisions are taken on a consensus basis
and once made, the members typically present an unified front. Id.
114 Id.
115 Simon Holberton, HKDelays Democracy Legislation, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 12, 1993, at 4. But
see Premier Li Peng Reaffirms Tough Line on Hong Kong, JAPAN ECON. NEwswTRE, Jan. 23, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File (quoting Li Peng's somewhat ambiguous
statement that "[flrom first to last, we will consistently devote ourselves to maintaining long-
term prosperity and development in Hong Kong and Macao.... Recent actions by the Hong
Kong and British sides have blocked the way towards Hong Kong's peaceful and stable transi-
tion and continued prosperity." Mr. Li's statement certainly blames the British, but also reaf-
firms China's commitment to a prosperous Hong Kong, which presumably may mean a
Hong Kong administered under the Basic Law).
116 Patten's HK Reform Row with China-A Chronology, The Reuters Library Report, Apr.
21, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
117 Id.
118 China Threatens Shadow Authority for Hong Kong, PRESS ASS'N NEwsrnE, Mar. 17, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
119 China to Form Own HK Government Amid Democracy Row, AGENCE FRANCE PRSSE, Mar.
17, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File.
1993]
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
sponsible" and "an eternal criminal."120 Chris Patten issued his
standard reply that he would be willing to discuss any proposals China
wished to put forward. 121
The next Chinese statement during the standoff indicated an-
other of China's periodic rhetorical retreats. In a press conference on
April 1, 1993, recently re-elected Premier Li Peng stated that China
would be willing to enter into negotiations if Britain would adhere to
the Joint Declaration, the Basic Law, and various private agreements
between London and Hong Kong. 122 This seemingly straightforward
position was complicated by Chinese stipulations that Hong Kong offi-
cials could not participate in any talks on the same basis as the British
officials and that LegCo could not have a voice in approving any agree-
ments.123 Talks were suspended for one month, but on April 13, 1993,
Britain and China announced that negotiations concerning the future
of Hong Kong would resume on April 22.124 The next day, the Hang
Seng Index gained 371 points, reaching a record high. 125 When the
talks opened, the Hong Kong officials were not marked with name-
plates, which comported with China's requirement that they not be
official delegates.' 26 Despite this superficial concession by the British,
both sides conceded at the end of the three-day conference that no
headway had been made, beyond the fact that the talks themselves had
resumed. 127
Prior to the beginning of the third round of talks, Governor Pat-
ten traveled to the United States and met with President Clinton, who
praised his efforts to advance democracy in Hong Kong. 128 While in
the United States, Chris Patten seemed to suggest that there should be
some linkage between the success of his democratic proposals and the
renewal of China's most-favored-nation trading privileges with the
United States.129 This effort has been characterized as an attempt to
play Hong Kong's international card: by emphasizing Hong Kong's
status as a major international trading emporium and center of fi-
nance, Chris Patten may hope to encourage the industrial democracies
to pressure China into relenting.130 To all appearances this latest tac-
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Graham Hutchings, China Has 'Not Closed Door on Hong Kong, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Apr. 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
123 Id.
124 Patten's HK Reform Row With China-A Chronology, supra note 116.
125 Id.
126 David Schlesinger, Sino-British HK Talks Resune, More Rounds Seen, The Reuters Li-
brary Report, Apr. 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
127 China Takes Hard Line Ahead of Hong Kong Talks, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, May 17, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International Library.
128 Paper Says Patten 'Really Became a Whore'During US Visit, BBC, May 17, 1993, available in





tic enraged Chinese officials, but knowing they could not afford to lash
out against the western leaders who would decide crucial issues involv-
ing trade with China, the Chinese restrained themselves and issued
only a scathing denouncement of Chris Patten.131
The round ofJLG talks beginning on May 21, 1993 was somewhat
more productive than the two that immediately preceded it. The Joint
Liaison Group was able to reach agreements concerning electricity
franchises and a landfill, as well as setting a schedule for discussions
concerning the financing of the airport project.'32 At this point, some
commentators expressed their belief that the relations between Brit-
ain and the PRC had resumed their normal form: secret negotiations
with the Chinese would be utilized to reach an agreement before the
announcement of any proposals to the people of Hong Kong.133
Thus, prior to the next round of talks, there was some indication
that substantive issues would finally be discussed.' 3 4 The British down-
played any firm commitment to the specifics of the Patten proposals,
apparently willing to negotiate for a more limited increase in the
franchise for Hong Kong citizens. Unfortunately, the anticipated
breakthrough failed to materialize in either of the next two rounds of
JLG talks. Indicative of the inability to reach any form of agreement
was the failure of the meetings to produce a much desired go ahead
for a ninth container terminal.'35 The British team leader Anthony
Galsworthy stated that "[t] he results from three days of discussions have
been pretty marginal and it is clear to me that the Chinese side ap-
proached the meeting with the intention of allowing only minimal
progress. "136
On July 9, 1993, Chris Patten completed his first year as the last
British Governor of Hong Kong. In an effort to break the deadlock
that had plagued Patten's first year, British Foreign Secretary Douglas
Hurd flew to Beijing to discuss some compromise on the proposed
democratic reforms.'3 7 Despite working under a putative October
1993 deadline set by a previous memorandum of understanding, the
Chinese were adamant that Hurd would be unsuccessful if he pushed
131 One Chinese paper characterized Patten's proposal as the "three violations," and said
"[w] hen (Patten] was in the United States, Chris Patten really became a whore. When he met
Clinton at the White House on 3rd May, he tried, using his slick tongue, to sell Clinton his
'three violations' package...." Id.
132 A Welcome Thaw in Beijing, FIN. TIMES, May 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
Current File.
133 Id.
134 Ian Black, British Hopeful on Hong Kong Talks, THE GuARDLAN,June 9, 1993, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File.
135 Britain Attacks China After Hong Kong Talks Fail, JAPAN ECON. NEwswnm, June 23, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File.
136 Id.
137 Hong Kong: Britain Tries to Break DeMOcraly Deadlock, INTER PRESS SERVICE, July 7, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File.
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Patten's reform plan. 138 Following the meeting, the apparent failure
of Hurd's visit to break the impasse over Hong Kong was evident when
the Chinese indicated their intention to link their support for the air-
port project to the democracy battle.' 3 9 Meanwhile, rumors began to
circulate in Hong Kong that Britain had tabled the democracy propos-
als during the previous month's discussions. 140 Patten denied that the
democracy proposals had been buried in order for an agreement on
the airport to be reached, however, and the debate continued. 14'
IV. Analysis
A. Understanding the British Position
In examining the respective positions of both parties to this de-
bate, one is cast into a role not unlike that of an archeologist: with
only a handful of relics-primarily press releases-the archeologist
must try to extrapolate the underlying assumptions and reveal their
meaning. Perhaps the most effective way to begin to understand the
British position is to look for recurring themes in Britain's dealings
with the PRC on the issue of Hong Kong democracy. The most domi-
nant theme recognizable in British responses has been that the Chi-
nese should be specific in their criticism of the legality of the proposed
changes and that the British are willing to negotiate and compro-
mise.' 42 A survey of the give and take between the PRC and Britain
reveals a pattern whereby following the initial proposal or a period of
rapprochement between the parties, there has been a round of criti-
cism from an official of the PRC or some other China-controlled party
to which Chris Patten has most frequently responded by calling for
productive discussions and by challenging the Chinese authorities to
specify the alleged illegalities of his proposal.143
Given this as Britain's most frequent posture in the debate, the
next issue is to consider what it may reveal. Two possibilities almost
immediately suggest themselves. The first is that the British are so con-
fident that the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law support their posi-
tion that they believe discussions with the PRC will establish the legality
of the proposed democratization. The other likely alternative seems to
be that believing the PRC will never accede to the suggestion that the
parties negotiate some sort of agreement on the issue, the British have
138 Wu Jianmin, the PRC's Foreign Ministry Spokesman, stated that "[t]he Basic Law of
Hong Kong has sufficient guarantees of the democratic rights of Hong Kong residents after
1997." Hurd China Visit Attempt to Cut Through Bitter Row, The Reuter Library Report, July 8,
1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
139 Andrew Wong, Patten Must Scrap Plan for Airport Deal THE REl TrER ASIA-PACIFIC Bus.
REP., July 16, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 See supra notes 74, 121 and accompanying text.
143 See supra part III.
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deliberately utilized this suggestion as a way to delay while the changes
to Hong Kong's electoral system are actually implemented.
1. Legality of the Democratic Changes
In examining the first proposition-that the British believe in the
legality of the proposed changes-the place to look is the Joint Decla-
ration and the Basic Law. The Joint Declaration reiterates that the
United Kingdom will continue to govern Hong Kong between the ef-
fective date of the Joint Declaration and June 30, 1997.144 The Joint
Declaration places no explicit limitations on the governing authority of
the United Kingdom during the transitional period, however, except
that the UK is to govern with the object of maintaining stability and
prosperity.' 45 Most notably, the British are not required to seek Chi-
nese approval in their governing operations. 146
It is clear that this paragraph of the Joint Declaration neither
places limits on Britain's governance of Hong Kong during the transi-
tional period, nor gives the PRC a veto over British initiatives. Never-
theless, one might be able to make a case against the British position
by asserting that the proposed democratization runs afoul of para-
graph four of the Joint Declaration in that the proposals socially
destabilize Hong Kong and have injured the city's prosperity. 147 Cer-
tainly, the Chinese at least rhetorically claim this is the case, as is evi-
denced by the frequent warnings that Chris Patten's proposals will lead
to social chaos and economic collapse.' 48 The Chinese position on
this issue has been to insist that Hong Kong has peacefully prospered
without democracy and that its late introduction is thus inimical to the
Hong Kong way of life. 149 One might point to some of the turmoil
which has recently afflicted Hong Kong's Hang Seng Index as evidence
supporting this allegation.' 50
There is an effective response that can be made, however, to this
interpretation of paragraph four of the Joint Declaration and the
events surrounding the democracy proposals. The Joint Declaration
provides that Britain must maintain stability and prosperity, but even if
one concedes that the proposals have jeopardized the stability provi-
sion, it is possible that democracy in Hong Kong is now necessary to
maintain Hong Kong's booming economy. This position has been ad-
vanced by Chris Patten and by others who suggest that Hong Kong has
reached a level of affluence and economic sophistication where demo-
144 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 4; see supra note 38 and accompanying text.
145 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para.4; see supra note 43 and accompanying text.
146 The joint Declaration does state that the PRC is to cooperate in Britain's administra-
tion of Hong Kong. Joint Declaration para. 4, supra note 1.
147 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
148 See supra notes 102, 115 and accompanying text.
149 See supra notes 114-115 and accompanying text.
150 See supra notes 101-102, 117, 125 and accompanying text.
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cratic government becomes necessary for further growth. 15 1 The argu-
ment is that even though the proposals cause some short-term
disruption in stability, they accord with the requirement that Britain
continue to administer the city in such a way that economic prosperity
is ensured and enhanced.
The other provision of the Joint Declaration that is most relevant
to the British belief that their democratic proposals are legal is the
subsection of paragraph three-an unilateral declaration by the
PRC-which provides that "It] he laws currently in force in Hong Kong
will remain basically unchanged." 5 2 The problem with this provision
is determining at what point it freezes the laws of Hong Kong so that
they will remain basically unchanged. If the provision went into effect
at the signing of the Joint Declaration, then one can see that the Brit-
ish proposals may amount to the kind of change to the laws of Hong
Kong that is forbidden. On the other hand, if the provision seeks to
freeze the laws of Hong Kong at changeover in 1997, then it will osten-
sibly bind the PRC to maintaining the democratic system put into
place by the British during these last years of British rule.
There is evidence that the latter interpretation should be applied.
The majority of the context of the provision seems to support a pro-
British interpretation. The relevant subsection is composed of two
sentences: the first states that "[t] he Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region will be vested with executive, legislative and independent judi-
cial power, including that of final adjudication"; and the second speaks
of the laws in force remaining "basically unchanged." Clearly, the first
sentence is talking of Hong Kong after the changeover because it
speaks of the Hong Kong SAR, which will not exist until the change-
over has occurred. Thus, it would seem unlikely that the second sen-
tence is meant to refer to some other, previous time frame, since a
different time is not stated. Instead, the subsection as a whole reads as
though it will come into effect on June 1, 1997. If a different time
frame for the second sentence had been intended, it could have been
more clearly indicated. This reading is born out by the fact that the
entire third paragraph of the Joint Declaration is given over to outlin-
ing the PRC's plans for Hong Kong when the city returns to Chinese
control. 153
The next place to look for guidance when examining the possibil-
ity that the British believe that the proposed changes are legal is the
Basic Law itself. 5 4 In doing so, it is important to remember that the
Chinese-authored Basic Law applies to Hong Kong after the change-
151 See also George L. Hicks, Red Capitalism, in BAsrc QUESTIONS, supra note 54, at 97, 109
"It is an illusion to think that it will be possible to maintain a competitive and prosperous
economy without the acceptance of liberal values, including democracy." Id.
152 Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3 (emphasis added).
153 Id.; see supra note 40 and accompanying text.
154 Basic Law, supra note 2.
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over, but is still relevant to this issue to the extent that it is based on
the Joint Declaration and thus indicates the Chinese understanding of
that document. As such, certainly the most facially relevant provision
of the Basic Law is that which states that the ultimate aim is to establish
universal suffrage for LegCo elections in the Hong Kong SAR.' 55
This intention-more ambitious than even Chris Patten's current
proposals-is vaguely stated, however, phrased only as an "ultimate
goal."156 Thus, on the point of LegCo elections, the Basic Law con-
tains no truly definite commitment. Given the fact that China's oppo-
sition to Chris Patten's proposals has not been based solely on the fact
that it is the British who wish to introduce democracy-the Chinese
have repeatedly voiced philosophic and economic objections to the
British proposals, not just political ones157 -the PRC's commitment to
the introduction of universal suffrage for LegCo elections could be
doubted.
Nevertheless, the fact of the matter is that the Basic Law does in-
clude this goal of democracy in Hong Kong. This would suggest that
the Chinese understanding of the Joint Declaration is such that at the
least, it does not preclude the eventual introduction of universal suf-
frage.' 58 There is a conceptual chasm, however, between this conclu-
sion and the question of whether the British themselves are prevented
from doing so. It may be that this provision of the Basic Law has no
direct implication for the British introduction of democracy in Hong
Kong, but it does tend to undercut the occasional Chinese position
that any expansion of democracy in Hong Kong is not feasible. In-
stead, of necessity, Article 68 of the Basic Law should limit the Chinese
to protesting only the introduction of democracy by the British.
Article 68, when read in conjunction with Article 8 of the Basic
Law, does reveal one other fact that is relevant to the possible British
understanding that their introduction of democracy in Hong Kong is
legal. Article 8 states that the laws in force in Hong Kong will remain
so, in the Hong Kong SAR, so long as they do not contradict the Basic
Law.' 59 As such, to the extent that the Basic Law at least contemplates
universal suffrage in Hong Kong, the British proposals to introduce
greater democracy may be protected under the Basic Law when the
city is governed under the Hong Kong SAR.
Finally, there is an additional provision of the Basic Law that bears
on the proposal for broader suffrage in LegCo elections. Article 3 of
155 Id. art. 68; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
156 Basic Law, note 2, art. 68.
157 See supra notes 68, 79, 109 and accompanying text.
158 As the Joint Declaration was the model for the Basic Law, the assumption is that the
provisions of the Basic Law may not contradict those made in the Joint Declaration. A differ-
ent consideration, however, is the extent to which the Basic Law may exceed the require-
ments of the Joint Declaration.
159 Basic Law, supra note 2; see supra note 57-59 and accompanying text.
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Annex I to the Basic Law states that the chief executive officer-the
individual who will serve as governor in the Hong Kong SAR-will be
elected "in accordance with principles of democracy and openness."160
Although this commitment is not directly relevant to Chris Patten's
proposals in that it refers to executive elections and not those in the
legislature, it does provide some secondary evidence that democracy is
at least comprehensible under the Basic Law. Thus, there are several
colorable bases from which the British could have concluded that de-
mocracy in Hong Kong is legal under the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law. For this reason, the British have repeatedly stated a desire
to enter a dialogue with the Chinese on this issue.
2. The British Position as a Delaying Tactic
The next point for consideration, however, is the alternative possi-
bility that the British know the Chinese will never accede to a meaning-
ful discussion on the topic of democracy in British-ruled Hong Kong
and thus, have made these repeated attempts at dialogue merely as a
delaying tactic while actual democratic change is implemented. The
question this interpretation begs is why the British would do such a
thing, when it is clearly against Chinese wishes and when the PRC
could probably produce a plausible interpretation of the Joint Declara-
tion and the Basic Law that would undo any British expansion of Hong
Kong democracy.' 6 1
A multi-faceted answer to this enigma suggests itself. The first
point to understand is that despite occasional willingness to seek Chi-
nese approval where politic, 162 the British seem determined that, until
the changeover, Hong Kong is still subject to their sole rule. As such,
the repeated insistence on a desire to negotiate the issue may be noth-
ing more than an effort to maintain a public relations front of appar-
ent willingness to cooperate. Meanwhile, the changes would be
implemented and the debate would become moot. In essence, Britain
would have acquired democracy for Hong Kong without gaining the
permission of the PRC-regardless of whether or not such permission
is required by the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law-while making
the Chinese officials appear to be unreasonable in their unwillingness
to negotiate changes.
Underpinning such a tactic would be the further assumption that
160 Basic Law, supra note 2, Annex 1, art. 3.
161 Under Article 17, and pursuant to Article 8 of the Basic Law, the Standing Commit-
tee of the National People's Congress may overrule any law in the Hong Kong SAR which it
decides contradicts the Basic Law. Id. arts. 8, 17; see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
See also infra notes 168-169 and accompanying text.
162 One area where the input and consent of the Chinese has been essential is the mas-
sive airport and shipping facility being constructed at Chek Lap Kok. The primary reason for
this has been that the funding for the project will extend beyond the changeover, and as
such, Chinese approval has been necessary to secure it. Inevitably, this has afforded the PRC
a degree of input on the project.
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the PRC either could not legally reverse the democratic changes in
Hong Kong or would not do so. 163 There are several reasons why the
British might believe the PRC would not reverse the democratic expan-
sion in Hong Kong: international public opinion would be against
such an action; 164 the people of Hong Kong might evidence some un-
willingness to accept such a change; and most importantly, it might
deal a serious setback to Hong Kong's economy. Simply put, the Brit-
ish may be relying on the notion that once a benefit has been con-
ferred, it is usually very difficult to take it away without substantial
resistance. The obvious difficulty with this interpretation of the British
bargaining position is that the British have to be aware that the PRC
has demonstrated its resolve on similar issues in the past, regardless of
international pressure and popular disapproval. 165 On the other
hand, it may be a concern about just this kind of Chinese intransi-
gence that has motivated the British to push for democratization in
Hong Kong in the first place, believing that the potential benefits of
broader democracy outweigh the risk of its being rescinded.
B. Understanding the Chinese Position
One might characterize the Chinese side of the democracy debate
as consisting of a chorus of different voices hitting seemingly discor-
dant notes, frequently at the same time. At some point, however, these
disparate tones begin to merge into some discernible pattern. The
PRC has frequently followed a strongly worded attack on the British
position with a seeming reduction of rhetoric. This "good cop, bad
cop" routine has been conducted by the utilization of many different
organs to vocalize the most current Chinese position. Despite this fa-
cial inconsistency, however, the PRC's official view of democracy in
163 For a discussion of the legal interpretation of the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law
which would seem to preclude the PRC from reversing a British broadening of democracy
after changeover, see supra part IV.A.1. and accompanying text.
164 One should not assume that because the international community failed to respond
effectively to the Tiananmen Square incident, such would be the case if there were to be
some sort of "crackdown" in Hong Kong. A more forceful response could be expected be-
cause many nations have substantial sums invested in Hong Kong, as well as citizens living
and working there. Also, Hong Kong's importance as a center of international trade and
finance should encourage the international community to take an interest in the city's treat-
ment by the PRC.
In addition, the United States has already rhetorically pressed the PRC for liberaliza-
tions, particularly under the Clinton Administration. It seems likely that if the PRC sought to
reverse any increase in democracy in Hong Kong the United States would be particularly
unhappy. Given the PRC's annual struggle to renew most-favored-nation trading status with
the United States, such a policy towards Hong Kong might have far reaching consequences
for China.
165 On June 4, 1989, following several weeks of pro-democracy student protests in Bei-
jing's Tiananmen Square, the People's Liberation Army forcibly ended the protest, inflicting
substantial bloodshed. McGuRN, supra note 8, at 81-88 (1991). Despite extensive protests at
the time in previously apathetic Hong Kong, as well as almost universal condemnation by the
world's leaders, the government of the PRC has never formally indicated that the action
taken was extreme, or indeed, the concern of any other party.
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Hong Kong may be quite fairly characterized as predominately nega-
tive. 166 In some respects, however, it may be that the strategy of the
leaders of the PRC is similar to that of the British, even if their posi-
tions on the issue seem to be diametrically opposed at this point. For
example, at least two alternatives present themselves: the PRC either
believes that its position is the one best supported by the relevant law;
or the PRC is deliberately engaging in a delaying strategy. Finally, an
examination of the form of the Chinese opposition, which has been
disproportionately directed against Chris Patten as an individual, raises
questions as to what the purpose behind this tactic might be.
1. The Legality of Democratic Changes: The Chinese Perspective
Once again, the beginning point for this analysis is the Joint Dec-
laration. Repeatedly throughout the ongoing debate between the Brit-
ish and the PRC, Chinese officials have alleged that the proposed
democratic measures are illegal under the agreements entered into by
the two nations. 167 Unfortunately, the Chinese have just as frequently
refused to specify which provisions of the agreements are actually vio-
lated. As was discussed earlier in this Comment, the provision in the
Joint Declaration specifying that the current laws shall remain in force
is subject to varying interpretations.168 If the Chinese were to assert
this provision as a shield to prevent British changes to the law in Hong
Kong during the years between the signing of the Joint Declaration
and the changeover in 1997, then the argument they would likely use
is that the Joint Declaration froze the laws in Hong Kong from being
changed at the moment the agreement was signed. There does not
appear to be anything specific in the Joint Declaration that would belie
such an interpretation. In fact, it is contained in one of the unilateral
declarations of the Joint Declaration by the Chinese, 169 and the Chi-
nese might attempt to fashion an argument that their interpretation
should apply.
Given the PRC's predilection for emphasizing the sole governing
authority of sovereigns, however, such a result would seem to be inher-
ently contradictory. The primary reason for this conclusion is that if
the Joint Declaration is so construed, it would arguably preclude the
present government of Hong Kong from passing any legislation which
alters the fundamental character of an existing law.170 As such, this
166 Although the question of motivation is one that often cannot be answered, one
might consider that the Tiananmen Square incident, as well as the PRC's heated opposition
to the possibility of greater democracy in Hong Kong have at their root a common policy.
The fact that in both of these cases, the Chinese leadership was willing to take dramatic
measures and endure substantial international criticism suggests that an anti-democratic pol-
icy may be a high priority.
167 See supra notes 67-68, 79, 86, 84, 108-109, 122 and accompanying text.
168 See supra part IVA.1. and accompanying text.
169 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
170 Note that the Joint Declaration does not apply this prohibition to only "essential"
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interpretation could well deprive the government of Hong Kong of its
ability to function as an effective administrative and representative
body during the years of transition. Although it is possible that the
British could have, in essence, contracted away their governing powers
in a way that might obliterate their authority, such an interpretation is
almost impossible to accept without evidence of a direct intention to
do so. The Joint Declaration itself seems to contradict such a conclu-
sion: its requirement that the British continue to govern during the
transitional period-placing special emphasis on preserving prosperity
and stability-would be rendered inoperative if the British were effec-
tively precluded from responding to changing circumstances by adapt-
ing the laws of Hong Kong accordingly. 171 It seems highly unlikely
that the British would accede to a provision with the understanding
that it could effectively liquidate Britain's ability to rule the city.
As for the Basic Law, the article that establishes universal suffrage
as an ultimate goal of an evolving political system in the Hong Kong
SAR could be interpreted in a manner that would support the Chinese
stand against the British introduction of further democracy. 172 The
essentials of this interpretation would be that by setting universal suf-
frage as a future goal, the Basic Law clearly contemplates universal suf-
frage will not be in place when the changeover occurs in 1997 and the
Basic Law goes into effect. This interpretation is highly vulnerable,
however, due to the fact that Chris Patten's changes have not proposed
granting universal suffrage in Hong Kong. 173 As such, it would seem
that increased democracy in Hong Kong under the British and the
Basic Law's future goal of implementing universal suffrage are not nec-
essarily mutually exclusive.
This survey of potential arguments the PRC might make, asserting
that the British proposals are illegal under either the Joint Declaration
or the Basic Law, indicates the weakness of the likely Chinese interpre-
tations. This may explain the fact that though the Chinese have fre-
quently stated their certitude that the changes are illegal, they have
just as often refused to specify the nature of the supposed illegalities.
Nevertheless, there is a point that can still be made that bolsters
this Chinese position. It is that the Chinese have resisted being specific
on these issues because of a belief that though the British proposals
may not violate any single provision of the Joint Declaration or the
Basic Law, the proposals taken in toto may violate the spirit of those
agreements, an unspoken understanding between the parties, or in-
laws. Instead, through the absence of such a modifier, it implies that all laws must remain
basically unchanged. Joint Declaration, supra note 1, para. 3.
171 Id. para. 4.
172 Basic Law, art. 68, supra note 2; see supra note 57 and accompanying text.
173 See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (outlining the actual changes Patten did
propose).
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deed, even some non-public memorandum. 174
2. The Chinese Position as a Delaying Tactic
As has been observed earlier in this Comment, the Chinese re-
sponse to Chris Patten's proposals has followed a pattern where the
rhetoric would heat up and the Chinese would indicate that compro-
mise is impossible, followed by a brief cooling period in which various
Chinese officials would suggest that negotiations might be useful.'75 If
one accepts that this is part of a coordinated strategy, and not the re-
sult of various officials and PRC-controlled sources merely sending dif-
ferent signals, then the interesting question of motivation arises. To
date, this strategy has not caused the British to withdraw from their
proposals, and such a result does not seem likely in the immediate
future. 176 Despite this fact, there is at least one interpretation of this
pattern which reveals a potential advantage to be gained by the
Chinese.
The Chinese may believe that this practice will cause the British to
keep seeking some negotiated agreement on the issue of greater de-
mocracy in Hong Kong. Presumably, so long as the British believe that
such an outcome is possible, they may not push to implement unilater-
ally the democratic proposals. If the Chinese can keep the British
thinking that they might be willing to meet the British part way, the
PRC may be able to cause the British to continually postpone further
democratization. The benefit of such an outcome would be that the
Chinese would receive a Hong Kong in 1997 that would be free of
additional democratic structures. As a result, the PRC would not have
to run the risk of the adverse publicity that would almost certainly oc-
cur if the PRC rescinded the post-Joint Declaration democratic
changes currently proposed for Hong Kong.
In addition, there is a more immediate benefit to be gained by the
PRC's delaying strategy. By at least periodically appearing willing to
enter actual negotiations with the British, the PRC can maintain cer-
tain public relations benefits. Even if the Chinese have no intentions
to allow further democracy in Hong Kong-a strong possibility when
174 China Will Stick to Joint Declaration, The Reuters Library Report, Jan. 8, 1993, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Reuter File.
175 See supra part Ill.
176 One commentator has suggested that the PRC's maneuvering on this issue has been
to test the British determination to rule Hong Kong effectively during the transitional pe-
riod, and that Britain has failed to demonstrate the necessary resolve. McGuRN, supra note 8,
at 67. In addition, it is a fact that Chris Patten has tabled four times bringing the proposals
before LegCo. Hong Kong: 'Hsin Pao' Interiew with Governor Patten, THE BBC SUMMARY OF
WoRLD BROADCASTS, June 28, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, International File. Fi-
nally, one should recall that the most recent rumor is that the proposals will be scrapped
entirely in exchange for the Chinese guarantees necessary for additional financing for the
airport project. This rumor almost inevitably raises the question of whether the democracy
proposals were conceived of in the first place as an artificial bargaining chip to be used by the
British during the last years of their rule.
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one considers that some of the PRC's highest officials have emphasized
on several occasions that this is a matter of principle which will not be
the subject of compromise77-a facade that indicates a willingness to
negotiate prevents one from immediately concluding that the Chinese
are being manifestly unreasonable in their treatment of the British
proposals. Instead, the occasional indication of a willingness to con-
sider compromise would tend to support the PRC's most frequent por-
trayal of these events: Britain has victimized the PRC in making these
unreasonable and illegal proposals, and the Chinese are merely trying
to rectify this unfortunate situation into which they have been so un-
fairly thrust.
3. Vilifying Chris Patten
Finally, anyone who has followed the progression of the debate
between these two nations has likely noticed the frequency with which
the Chinese have publicly attacked Chris Patten himself, and not nec-
essarily in his capacity as Governor. His actions have been character-
ized as "illegal" and "unreasonable," 178 he has been called a "whore"179
and an "eternal criminal,"1 80 and Patten has been accused of intending
to derail the changeover itself.18 ' It would seem that if the PRC genu-
inely desired some sort of compromise on this issue, it would not pur-
sue such an end by personally vilifying one of the individuals who
would be essential to reaching an agreement. Consequently, one won-
ders what is to be gained by these attacks on Mr. Patten, if there is in
fact any intentional thought given to them at all. There are at least two
reasons why this may be a useful strategy for the Chinese.
By attempting to focus the debate on Mr. Patten, the Chinese will
be able to obscure the real issue-the legality of Britain's proposed
changes-or at least detract attention from it. Even if one dismisses
out of hand the attacks on Mr. Patten as an individual, one cannot fail
to recognize that they have grabbed the headlines in a manner that
less enthralling defenses of the merits of the proposals cannot. Fur-
thermore, there may be a certain element of wishful thinking in the
Chinese efforts to cast aspersions against Chris Patten's character and
intentions. Simply put, the Chinese may believe that if they say it often
enough, someone may begin to believe it. The primary benefit which
would flow from such an outcome is that the affected people would
withdraw their support from Chris Patten and presumably from his
proposals as well. 182 This tactic would be most successful if it caused
177 See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
178 See supra note 86.
179 See sura note 131 and accompanying text.
180 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
181 See supra note 86.
182 The belief that if one repeats a label frequently enough, it will eventually begin to
stick in the mind of the hearer who will then come to believe it, may be the guiding principle
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the Hong Kong business community to withdraw its support from Mr.
Patten.
A closer consideration uncovers the possibility of a more subtle
rationale, however. By portraying Mr. Patten as unreasonable, the PRC
does not have to recognize the dangerously persuasive premise under-
lying his proposals: democracy will offer better protections for Hong
Kong under the PRC than a non-democratic government. While de-
picting Mr. Patten as a bad individual, the Chinese are able to attack
implicitly his proposals without having to address their value, which is
the value of democracy itself. One might suggest that this is the prem-
ise that the Chinese must, at all costs, keep from becoming the focus of
the debate. Even though some business leaders might grumble that
further democracy will decrease their freedom to operate, it seems
likely that few would prefer a form of government whose potential for
arbitrary action could be even more damaging to the stability necessary
for prosperity. So long as the PRC can use its attacks on Chris Patten
to divert Hong Kong's people from considering the relative benefits of
the actual proposals, it is possible that the public might not support
Chris Patten as strongly as it would if only the democracy proposals
were discussed.
V. Conclusions
Some believe that the relatively weak protection the Chinese-au-
thored Basic Law offers for Hong Kong's autonomy can only begin to
be offset by implementing direct election of LegCo members,1 3 and
unless Britain is successful in implementing democratic government in
Hong Kong, the potentially capricious rule of the PRC might destroy
the stability necessary for the city to continue to flourish.18 4 Although
such an outcome is far from forgone, it is self-evident that continued
wrangling over this issue-and especially the possibility that China
might, at some point after 1997, reverse any unilateral changes made
behind modern American political campaigns. It probably should not be dismissed as a
transparent and insulting tactic, considering how often it seems that one opponent's charac-
terization has come to be the label by which another candidate is known.
183 McGuRNt, supra note 8, at 71.
184 "[E]conomics do not exist in a political vacuum, and free economics, far from being
simply laissez-faire, rest on a political foundation where civil rights, individual worth, and gen-
eral liberal values are embedded. China's own history, by contrast, shows a 2000-year-old
belief in the virtues of benevolent interventionism and a capacity to engineer it, unshaken by
a parallel record of failure." Hicks, supra note 151, at 108-09. "Without a democratic and
accountable government and without the rule of law, Hong Kong will experience a surge in
corruption and guanxi (dependence on connections) that is endemic across the border and
the international business community will lose confidence in our ability to function as a
reliable financial center." Gene Linn, Stock Market is Casualty in War of Words, UPI, Dec. 20,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (quoting elected LegCo member Martin
Lee). See also Robin Fitzsimmons, Whose Law Will Rule Hong Kong?, THE TIMEs, June 22, 1993,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Current File (indicating that some businesspersons and




by the British-cannot fail to have an adverse impact on Hong Kong's
economic viability. Consequently, one is ultimately drawn to ask why
these nations risk the future of a city in which each has a vested inter-
est in its ongoing prosperity, especially given the less-than-revolution-
ary nature of the changes proposed.
The difficulty in answering this question arises because either
party could be acting out of motives very different from their publicly
stated positions. On the British side of the equation, one is tempted to
assume that the proposals were put forth because of a sincere belief
that Hong Kong both needs and deserves further democracy, and that
they are legal under the Joint Declaration and the Basic Law. But it is
possible that Britain is motivated by less charitable reasons, perhaps
introducing the changes solely to create a bargaining chip to be traded
for future cooperation from the Chinese. If one rejects the accepted
rationale that the changes were introduced to help ensure Hong
Kong's economic future, then it does seem strange that after a century
of undemocratic rule Britain has decided to become the champion of
political rights.
Similarly, the Chinese have suggested a number of reasons for
their opposition to the proposed expansion of democracy in Hong
Kong, including their interpretation of the Joint Declaration and the
Basic Law, but China's opposition to the proposals could be caused by
a number of other factors, including a concern that democracy in
Hong Kong might rekindle demands for the same on the mainland.
Consequently, one cannot assume that either side is necessarily acting
in good faith on this issue.
If Britain is seriously committed to expanding democracy in Hong
Kong, then it is essential that some negotiated agreement be reached
with the PRC, otherwise China could quite easily reverse such an ex-
panded franchise when it takes over in 1997. The most effective incen-
tive the British can offer the Chinese is to emphasize that China's own
self-interest will also be affected by the future stability and prosperity of
Hong Kong.
For its part, China should recognize that the actual impact of the
proposed changes to Hong Kong's electoral system may be illusory-
beyond their precedential value-due to the limited role of LegCo
under both the present administration and that outlined by the Basic
Law. If it is the "precedential value" of near-universal suffrage that the
Chinese are most threatened by, they should recall their oft-repeated
maxim of "one country, two systems."
Regardless of either Britain or China's underlying motivation, the
city and people of Hong Kong are the ones who have suffered from
this protracted debate. If both sides operated under the same set of
assumptions about the city's future and truly held the interests of
Hong Kong to be paramount, a compromise might have been reached
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sooner. Thus, the best solution to this debate is to cease playing games
with Hong Kong's future and to reach some compromise which avoids
the danger of unilateral action and retaliation. Unfortunately, given
that China and Britain do not have the same views on the legality and
morality of the proposed increase in democratic institutions-and it is
even possible that neither side is really fighting over the proposals, but
over some unrevealed agenda-such a resolution does not currently
seem likely.
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